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FIRST CIRCUIT
Block Island Fishing, Inc. v. Rogers, 844 F.3d 358 (1st Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether a defendant who overpaid a damages award
may offset the overpayment and sue for the sum in an independent action.
Id. at 359.
ANALYSIS: The court relied on a 5th Circuit decision, which held
that “once a shipowner pays maintenance and cure to the injured seaman,
the payments can be recovered only by offset against the seaman’s
damages award — not by an independent suit seeking affirmative
recovery.” Id. at 366 (internal citations omitted). The court believed that
this decision struck the proper balance between “protecting seamen in the
wake of debilitating on-the-job injury and ensuring that shipowners can
protect themselves from liability for sums attributable to concealed
preexisting injuries.” Id.
CONCLUSION: Defendant could not seek affirmative recovery of
maintenance and cure payments that it had already made, however, they
could offset the overpayment against any damages awarded to plaintiff at
trial. Id. at 362.
Sampson v. United States, 832 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the
government, at [a defendant’s] new [death] penalty phase hearing, from
seeking to prove two non-statutory aggravating factors which the jury at
[the defendant’s] first [death] penalty phase hearing found had not been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 42.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “the touchstone for doublejeopardy protection in capital-sentencing proceedings is whether there has
been an ‘acquittal.’” Id. at 44. The court noted that “an ‘acquittal’ in the
capital sentencing context turns on ‘whether the sentencer or reviewing
court has ‘decided that the prosecution has not proved its case’ that the
death penalty is appropriate.’” Id. The court further reasoned that the
jury’s decision at the penalty-phase of defendant’s first trial is not an
‘acquittal’ because “the jury found the death penalty justified, despite also
finding that the government had not proven two non-statutory aggravating
factors beyond a reasonable doubt to all members of the jury.” Id. The
court also noted that collateral estoppel, which is embodied in the Fifth
Amendment protection against double jeopardy, “does not bar the
introduction[,] at a second penalty-phase proceeding[,] of non-statutory
aggravating factors presented to, and not found proven by, an earlier
penalty-phase jury” because the two non-statutory factors “were not
necessary to [the defendant’s] death sentence.” Id. at 47.
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CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not bar the government from alleging those non-statutory
aggravating factors again at [a defendant’s] new [death] penalty-phase
proceeding.” Id. at 49.
United States v. George, 841 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “Whether – or under what circumstances – a highranking employee of a government contractor can be said to occupy a
position of trust vis-à-vis a defrauded government entity.” Id. at 67.
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by noting that the D.C., 2nd,
and 4th Circuits “have recognized that a defendant can be found to have
occupied (and abused) a position of trust vis-à-vis the government when
he misuses public funds through a combination of control over a
government contractor and a lack of government oversight.” Id. The court
reasoned that “a government agency sometimes may rely too heavily on a
high-ranking employee of a contractor and thereby place that individual in
a position of special trust.” Id. As such, both substantial control and
significant discretion over the affairs of the government contractor must
be established to warrant the application of the position-of-trust
enhancement. Id.
CONCLUSION: The defendant occupied a position of trust because
he dominated the corporation and managed the use of public funds with a
lack of meaningful government oversight from the governmental
authority. Id. at 69.
SECOND CIRCUIT
B.C. v. Mount Vernon Sch. Dist., 837 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “[W]hether an individual with a ‘disability’ under the
[Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)] categorically
qualifies as an individual with a ‘disability’ under the [Americans with
Disabilities Act] and Section 504” of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 155.
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit noted that because Section 504 expressly
incorporates the ADA’s definition of disability, it would refer to both
statutes as the ADA. Id. at 159 n.4. The court reasoned that a disability
under the ADA is “a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities,” while a disability under the IDEA
includes intellectual, hearing, speech or language impairments, among
others, that require “special education or related services.” Id. at 162 n.7
(internal citations omitted). The court focused on the language
“substantially limits” and reasoned that under the IDEA, a child might
require special education services because of an intellectual impairment,
but that impairment may not necessarily “substantially limit” a “major life
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activity,” as required by the ADA. Id. at 159 (internal citations omitted).
The court reasoned that the ADA and IDEA present distinct legal
standards, and therefore, “an individual will not qualify for the ADA’s
protections simply by virtue of his or her disabled status under the IDEA.”
Id. at 160.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that an “individual with a
‘disability’ under the IDEA [does not] categorically qualif[y] as an
individual with a ‘disability’ under the ADA and Section 504.” Id. at 155.
Ferrari v. Cnty. Of Suffolk, 845 F.3d 46 (2nd Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether the Due Process Clause permits a county that
presented evidence of a driver’s history of intoxicated or reckless driving
at a retention hearing, to “then shift the burden of going forward onto the
owner-driver to point to a specific alternative measure that he is willing
and able to sustain that might satisfy the County’s interest, and to
demonstrate that such alternative measure would be feasible for the driver
to accomplish.” Id. at 64.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[i]n assessing whether a
particular allocation of burdens comports with the Due Process Clause,
[the court must] look to the three-factor balancing test articulated in
Mathews v. Eldridge.” Id. The court noted that “[t]he test weighs: (1) the
private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation though the
procedures used and the value of other safeguards and (3) the
government’s interests.” Id. at 65. The court reasoned that an automobile
“owner may have an important interest in retaining the use of a motor
vehicle pendente lite” through its use as a mode of transportation, means
to earn a livelihood, and obtaining an education. Id. The court further
noted that “an individual may also have a financial interest in a vehicle
apart from its use by the owner himself.” Id. The court reasoned, however,
that although “the private interest in retaining access to a particular vehicle
pendente lite is strong, the private interest in affording claimants the
specific procedure demanded by [this claimant]—namely, that the County
bear the burden of disproving the feasibility of alternative measure . . . —
is weak” because this burden “does not greatly add to the protection
already afforded such owners pursuant to the [County’s] existing
procedures” and “could have the effect of delaying these hearings, which
would arguably be detrimental to the interest not only of innocent owners,
but title owners more generally.” Id. at 65–66.
The court further noted that “the County’s practice of shifting the
burden of going forward onto a title owner to articulate the case for an
alternative measure does not have any material effect on that owner’s
interest” because before the hearings in this County, “title owners receive
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notice as to the question that will be discussed, including the availability
of alternative measures” and the relevant evidence “is generally uniquely
within the purview of the title owner, who can thus be expected to gather
it without difficulty.” Id. at 66. The court further reasoned that, in
retaining the vehicle pendente lite, the County had a financial interest in
the vehicle and a particularly strong “interest in protecting the public from
use of the vehicle ‘as an instrumentality in future acts of driving while
intoxicated.’” Id. at 67.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that that “in weighing the
private interest, the risk of error, and the County’s interest, . . . it does not
violate the Due Process Clause for [the County], after establishing a prima
facie case that retention may be necessary to protect the County’s interests
in the financial value of the vehicle or in protecting the public from
repeated unsafe driving, to shift the burden of going forward to the title
owner to point to an alternative measure that he is willing and able to
sustain that might satisfy the County’s interests and to demonstrate, at least
as an initial matter, that such alternative measure would be feasible for
him.” Id. at 68.
Nowakowski v. New York, 835 F.3d 210 (2d. Cir. 2016)
QUESTION ONE: “Whether a sentence of conditional discharge and
one day’s community service, unfulfilled as of the time of filing the habeas
petition, satisfies the ‘in custody’ requirement of § 2254.” Id. at 213.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that the custody analysis “requires a
court to judge the ‘severity’ of an actual or potential restraint on liberty.”
Id. at 216. The court also noted that other courts had considered “restraints
on liberty that might appear short in duration” to be sufficiently severe as
“they required petitioners to appear in certain places at certain times,”
which restricted the freedom of movement available to the public. Id. The
court thus reasoned that because the restrictions required Nowakowski’s
physical presence at particular times and locations and carried potential of
adverse consequences for non-cooperation, that he was in fact “in custody”
pursuant to § 2254. Id. at 217.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that Nowakowski’s sentence
falls within the category of restraints that satisfy the statutory requirement
of custody. Id. at 217.
QUESTION TWO: “Whether a presumption of continuing collateral
consequences applies to Nowakowski’s conviction, thus presenting a live
case of controversy under Art. III despite the expiration of the sentence.”
Id. at 213.
ANALYSIS: The court examined the two-step analysis
from Spencer to examine if the presumption of continuing collateral
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consequences applies and existed in our case. Id. at 218. The court
determined that the presumption of continuing collateral consequences
applied in this case because Nowakowski’s conviction is criminal in nature
for the purposes of invoking the presumption, which only extends to
criminal cases. Id. at 222. The court found that the presumption existed
because of the possibility that Nowakowski could be impeached in a future
proceeding with this information, which was a sufficient collateral
consequence of the conviction. Id. at 225.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that Nowakowski’s conviction
is criminal for the purposes of the conviction and that he sufficiently
identified a continuing collateral consequence of the conviction. Id. at
228.
United States v. Epskamp, 832 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether 21 U.S.C. § 959(b) applies extraterritorially to
acts of possession with intent to distribute. Id. at 162.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 5th Circuit has concluded that
§ 959(b) extends extraterritorially to acts of possession with intent to
distribute. Id. at n.7. The court reasoned that the statute’s text and
structure lends itself to various interpretations. Id. at 163–65. The court
reasoned that limiting the statute to domestic acts “would have the peculiar
effect of establishing a purely domestic crime within a statute aimed at
combatting international narcotics smuggling and importation where
every other provision applies extraterritorially.” Id. at 164. Furthermore,
“reading § 959(b)(2) to proscribe only domestic conduct would render it a
redundancy within the federal statutory framework.” Id. Finally, the court
noted that the legislative history “strongly confirms our reading of the
statute’s text and structure.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “the structure, context, and
authoritative history of the statute reveal Congress’s clear intent that the
statute apply extraterritorially in its entirety.” Id. at 166.
United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135 (2d. Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “[W]hether Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of
violence under the force clause.” Id. at 140.
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit previously stated that conspiracy to
commit Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the Bail Reform
Act. Id. The risk-of-force clause, codified at 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(c)(3)(B),
defines a crime of violence as any felony that “has an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another.” Id. The court noted that the Supreme Court had
previously held that “physical force encompasses even its indirect
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application.” Id. at 143. Further, the court found the 9th Circuit’s holding
that Hobbs Act robbery “has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another”
persuasive. Id. at 144.
CONCLUSION: Hobbs Act robbery “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another.” Id.
United States v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether the “disqualification of counsel on the basis of
a conflict of interest pos[es] a potential harm to a nonparty non-witness.”
Id. at 238.
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit addressed this question by determining
whether “there [was] a substantial relationship between the subject matter
of the counsel’s prior representation of the moving party and the issues in
the present lawsuit.” Id. at 239. The 2nd Circuit reasoned that the district
court erred in classifying the individual as a “mere spectator to this
litigation.” Id. at 240. Rather, the court classified the individual as a
“putative victim.” Id. Because “crime victims, as well as witnesses,
possess legitimate interests in criminal proceedings,” disqualification of
counsel may be proper. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the risk of prosecution for
a nonparty, non-witness, “based on the potential disclosure of confidential
information obtained during a prior representation,” ultimately outweighs
any inconvenience for a defendant to obtain new counsel. Id. at 242.
THIRD CIRCUIT
Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 836 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether, in applying the “first-filed” rule, a district
court’s decision to dismiss the second-filed action with prejudice was an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 216.
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit began by noting that the first-filed rule
gives district courts several options with respect to the second-filed action:
stay, transfer, dismissal without prejudice or dismissal with prejudice. Id.
at 210. The court examined multiple treatises, finding that they reflect the
“commonsense proposition” that where the timeliness of a case is at issue
in the first-filed action, such as a statute of limitations expiration, dismissal
with prejudice could “have the effect of putting the plaintiffs entirely out
of court.” Id. at 217. The court then noted that the 5th, 7th, and 9th
Circuits have respectively found that the more appropriate use of
discretion afforded by the first-filed rule would be to stay or transfer the
second-filed action. Id. Relying on this line of case law, the court
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reasoned that district courts should take care so as to avoid causing undue
prejudice to litigants, which could result where a dismissal would prevent
the merits of the claim from ever being heard. Id. at 218–19. Finally, the
court explained that both the Supreme Court’s abstention doctrine, as well
as its own, support issuing a stay under the first-filed rule, in order to avoid
“abdication” of a court’s duty to exercise its jurisdiction and decide cases.
Id. at 220.
CONCLUSION: Adopting the jurisprudence of the 5th, 7th, and 9th
Circuits, the 3rd Circuit held that “in the vast majority of cases, a court
exercising its discretion under the first-filed rule should stay or transfer a
second filed suit,” concluding that “a dismissal with prejudice will almost
always be an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 220–21.
Didon v. Castillo, 838 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “[M]ay a child have two ‘habitual residence’ countries
at the same time under the Hague Convention (‘concurrent habitual
residence’)?” Id. at 316.
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit noted that the Convention was
unambiguous and repeatedly referenced “the State” of habitual residence.
Id. at 322 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). The court
looked to the ordinary meaning of “residence” to determine which country
was the “habitual residence.” Id. at 316. The court noted that determining
a habitual residence is a fact-intensive inquiry in which factors such as the
child’s physical presence, the child’s routine, the child’s connections with
people and places, and parents’ “present, shared intentions regarding their
child’s presence[.]” Id. at 326 (internal citation omitted).
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that under the Hague
Convention, a child may not have two habitual resident countries. Id. at
316.
Mack v. Loretto, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2016)
QUESTION ONE: “Whether an inmate’s oral grievance to prison
officials can constitute protected activity under the Constitution.” Id. at
291.
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit began by noting that the First
Amendment right to petition and right to free speech protects both written
and oral forms of expression. Id. at 297–98. The court further clarified
that an individual’s prisoner status does not preclude the protection of an
oral grievance to prison officials under the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment, so long as the right being exercised is not “incompatible with
[the individual’s] status as a prisoner.” Id. at 298. Finally, adopting the
rationale of the 7th Circuit—the only other circuit to have addressed the
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issue—the court determined that the right to petition for redress of
grievances does not depend on the form in which the grievance takes, such
as an oral, rather than written complaint. Id. at 299.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that a prisoner’s oral grievance
is protected activity under the First Amendment. Id.
QUESTION TWO: Whether the Religious Freedom and Restoration
Act (RFRA) “prohibits individual conduct that substantially burdens
religious exercise.” Id. at 291.
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit first examined the plain language of
RFRA, which states that “Government” includes “a branch, department,
agency, instrumentality, and official or other person acting under color of
law.” Id. at 301. The court interpreted this language to mean that the
statute is not limited to only those actions taken by officials or other
persons acting under the color of law that are “in furtherance of an official
policy,” but rather that RFRA prohibits “almost every” official action
taken by any official of the Government, as the Supreme Court has
previously determined. Id. The court further reasoned that the similarities
between the definition of “Government” under RFRA and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983—the latter imposing liability for individual conduct of “state
officials or private persons acting under the color of law”—presumes that
Congress intended for RFRA to be similarly construed. Id. at 302.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that RFRA prohibits the burden
of religious exercise through “individual government conduct whether or
not it is undertaken pursuant to an official rule or policy.” Id.
QUESTION THREE: “Whether RFRA provides monetary relief from
an official sued in his individual capacity.” Id. at 291.
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit noted at the outset that although RFRA
indicates that plaintiffs may obtain “appropriate relief,” the statute does
not define the meaning of this term. Id. at 302. As a result, the court
turned to the “traditional presumption” of the term’s meaning, articulated
by the Supreme Court, which indicates that “absent clear direction to the
contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any
appropriate relief . . . brought pursuant to a federal statute.” Id. at 303
(internal quotations omitted). The court justified its application of this
presumption to RFRA on the basis that both the Supreme Court and the
statute refer to the identical language, that Congress was aware of the
interpretation of the Supreme Court at the time of RFRA’s enactment, and
that RFRA was intended to provide “broad religious liberty protections.”
Id. Similar to its analysis of the scope of RFRA’s protections, the court
also found persuasive the similarities between RFRA and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which provides monetary relief for the individual conduct of state
officials. Id. Finally, the court distinguished RFRA from its sister statute,
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Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),
which has been construed as not providing monetary relief for individual
conduct, as the two statutes were enacted pursuant to different
congressional powers, the former the Necessary and Proper Clause and the
latter, the Spending Clause. Id. at 303–04.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit concluded that “federal officers who
violate RFRA may be sued in their individual capacity for damages.” Id.
at 304.
Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77 (3d Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “Whether [a State University] is an arm of the State of
New Jersey, which would render it immune from the discrimination suit
brought by [an ex-employee].” Id. at 81.
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by reasoning that the
Eleventh Amendment “has [been] interpreted . . . to bar suits against a
State by its own citizens—not just those from other jurisdictions.” Id. at
83 (internal citations omitted). In addition, the court noted that the
Amendment bars not only suits against States themselves, but also suits
for damages against “arms of the State”—entities that, by their very nature,
are so intertwined with the State that any suit against them renders the
State the “real, substantial party in interest.” Id. The court then opined
that the three factor Fitchik test is to apply to determine “whether a stateaffiliated entity is an ‘arm of the State’ that falls within the ambit of
the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. (citing Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail
Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989)). The court reasoned
that while the “funding factor weighs against immunity, . . . its status
under state law and autonomy factors both favor immunity.” Id. at 99.
CONCLUSION: The State University is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment protection. Id.
United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether social media chat logs can be introduced and
properly authenticated under the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) since
the exact author cannot be determined. Id. at 405.
ANALYSIS: The analysis of the court proceeds in two steps as to
proper authentication of social media. Id. The court must analyze whether
the communications at issue are business records that may be “selfauthenticated” by way of certificate from custodian under FRE 902(11)
and whether the Government nonetheless provided sufficient evidence to
authenticate the records under FRE 901. Id. First, the court decided that
the recording of social media chat logs by the host website are not records
of regularly conducted activity subject to the self-authentication rule
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governing business records. Id. at 410. Second, the court reasoned that
evidence arising from social media records might be authenticated by
extrinsic evidence in the same way as documentary evidence. Id. at 412.
As such, it is no less proper to consider a wide range of evidence for the
authentication of social media records than it is for more traditional
documentary evidence. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that although the exact author of a
social media chat cannot be determined, social media chat logs could be
introduced as evidence if the authentication can be proven by a veritable
mountain of evidence linking the person in question to the statements
made in the chat. Id. at 415.
FOURTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Batato, 833 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000
(“CAFRA”) is unconstitutional as a deprivation of Due Process under the
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 426.
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that the Supreme Court had
previously “struck a federal district court’s use of disentitlement to strike
a civil forfeiture claimant’s defense.” Id. In that opinion, the Supreme
Court left open the question of whether a statute that authorized such a
practice would be constitutionally prohibited. Id. After that decision was
rendered, Congress enacted CAFRA. Id. The court began its analysis by
distinguishing the Supreme Court’s reasoning on the grounds that its
opinion was mainly directed at the balance of power between the branches
of government and the opinion signaled that the analysis might be different
if the practice was contained within a statute. Id. at 427. The court stated
that CAFRA did not eliminate the opportunity to be heard as the claimants
could have secured a hearing at any time by entering the United States. Id.
The court also reasoned that “the refusal to face criminal charges that
would determine whether or not the claimants came by the property at
issue illegally supports a presumption that the property was, indeed, so
obtained.” Id. The court further distinguished this case from the prior
Supreme Court opinion by noting that “the property is located outside the
United States, complicating jurisdiction and the district court’s ability to
resolve” the issues in front of it. Id. at 429. As such, the court reasoned
that “notions of due process are not so rigid that they cannot be adapted in
light of a party’s clear intent to use procedural guarantees to avoid
substantial justice.” Id.
CONCLUSION: Since CAFRA “predicates disentitlement on an
allowable presumption that a criminal fugitive lacks a meritorious defense
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to a related civil forfeiture, . . . it does not violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.” Id.
United States v. Muldrow, 844 F.3d 434 (4th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether a district court, in calculating the “applicable
guideline range” at resentencing is bound by United States Sentencing
Guideline Amendment 759. Id. at 437.
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit began by noting that if Amendment
759—which revises the commentary to § 1B1.10 of the Guidelines
regarding the calculation of the “applicable guideline range” for reducing
a sentence—conflicts with the text of Guidelines, “[the commentary]
cannot bind courts.” Id. at 439. The court then compared the language of
the commentary to § 1B1.10 with Amendment 759’s definition of
“applicable guideline range,” to the extent it permits consideration of a
sentencing court’s departure or variance from a defendant’s criminal
history occurring at the original sentencing, and failed to identify any
inconsistences in the text. Id. at 440. The court determined that
“Amendment 759’s clarifying definition is consistent with § 1B1.10,” in
that Amendment 759 expressly limits the consideration of departure or
variance only once the guideline range has been calculated, whereas the
commentary to § 1B1.10 does not account for departures and variances.”
Id. The court further explained that although the application instructions
of the Guidelines direct a judge to determine the defendant’s criminal
history category, that a court is required to make this determination “does
not give the judge a license to factor in a departure,” as a court “cannot
factor in a departure from a [guideline] range before calculating the range
itself.” Id. at 441 (internal quotations omitted). The court also determined
that Amendment 759 applied to a defendant’s resentencing, as it was
enacted prior to the disposition of a motion for a sentence reduction,
despite the fact that the edition of the Guidelines enacted at the time of the
original sentence normally controls. Id. at 441–42. Finally, the court
noted that the 2nd Circuit similarly concluded that the Sentencing
Commission “foreclosed” potential inconsistencies between the
Guidelines and the Amendment that would render a sentencing court not
bound by the Amendment’s definition of the applicable guideline range.
Id. at 442.
CONCLUSION: Joining “all of [their] sister circuits that have
considered the issue,” the 4th Circuit held that “Amendment 759 binds
sentencing courts.” Id. at 436.
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United States v. Rand, 835 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether subpoenas issued to third parties pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) (“Rule 17(c)”) are subject only
to the explicit standard of the rule—oppressive or unreasonable—or the
higher standard articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon
(“the Nixon Test”) in order to avoid being modified or quashed by the
court. Id. at 462–63.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the Nixon Test requires the
requesting party to demonstrate “(1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; [and] (3)
specificity.” Id. at 462. The court acknowledged that the Nixon Test could
be read as applying only to subpoenas issued against the prosecution, but
noted that the Supreme Court declined to answer that question. Id. The
court then stated that the Nixon Test was not explicitly limited to requests
from the government or prosecution. Id. at 463. Next, the court noted that
the explicit requirements of Rule 17(c) were not incompatible with the
requirements of the Nixon Test, stating that “[a] subpoena should be
quashed as unreasonable or oppressive if it is ‘irrelevant; abusive or
harassing; overly vague; or excessively broad.’” Id. Finally, the court
noted that these Rule 17(c) requirements “map on quite well to
the [Nixon] standard of relevance, admissibility, and specificity.” Id.
(internal citations omitted).
CONCLUSION: The Nixon Test is the appropriate standard for Rule
17(c) subpoenas requesting documents from third parties. Id.

FIFTH CIRCUIT
Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether discovery of U immigration visa records from
individual claimants can be barred under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c) as imposing an undue burden. Id.
ANALYSIS: The court set out to determine the probative value of
allowing U visa discovery in order to potentially show fraud and therefore
impeach some of the plaintiff’s claims. Id. The court gave deference to
the district court’s ruling that such discovery was relevant after failing to
find an abuse of discretion on the district court’s behalf. Id. The court,
however, then balanced the probative value with the issue of whether
allowing such discovery would create an undue burden on plaintiffs
because of the possibility that it would dissuade other plaintiffs from
coming forward out of fear of losing their jobs or being reported. Id. The
5th Circuit reasoned that “allowing such discovery of U visa information
may have a chilling effect extending well beyond this case, imperiling
important public purposes” and when weighed against the significant
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interests of the defendant, the court found that the discovery would impose
an undue burden. Id. at 564.
CONCLUSION: “The statute bars discovery of U visa records from
the EEOC, but it does not bar discovery of the records from the individual
claimants.” Id. at 554.
Enable Miss. River Transmission, L.L.C. v. Nadel & Gussman, L.L.C.,
844 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether the National Gas Act’s (“NGA”) exclusive
jurisdiction provision extends to actions involving third party interference.
Id. at 496.
ANALYSIS: The court relied on the reasoning of the 6th and 9th
Circuits. Id. at 499–500. The 9th Circuit held that because a well-operator
was not subject to any duties under the NGA, it could not violate the NGA
and be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction clause. Id. Similarly, the 6th
Circuit reasoned that defendants must possess a statutory duty to violate
the NGA. Id. at 500–01. The court reasoned that since the Defendant did
not have any duties under the NGA or any applicable regulations,
resolution of State law claims would not require the court “to determine
whether the defendants [have] complied with rules that [have] the effect
and force of federal law.” Id. at 501 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
CONCLUSION: The court declined to extend the federal exclusivity
provision of the NGA to cover claims of interference against defendants
who have no statutory duties under the Act. Id.
Lee v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 837 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: What is “the degree to which the impact of fiduciary
misconduct must be realized . . . in order to establish [constitutional]
standing” in an ERISA action brought by a participant in a defined-benefit
plan? Id. at 545.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit explained that “fiduciary misconduct in
a defined-benefit plan ‘will not affect an individual’s entitlement to a
defined benefit unless it creates or enhances the risk of default by the entire
plan.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). Because of this, the constitutional
requirement under Article III for a particularized injury in fact “is
attenuated as, prior to default under the plan, ‘the employer typically bears
the entire investment risk and—short of the consequences of plan
termination—must cover any underfunding as the result of a shortfall that
may occur from the plan’s investments.’” Id. (citations omitted). The 5th
Circuit agreed with the 4th Circuit, stating, “fiduciary misconduct,
standing alone without allegations of impact on individual benefits, is too
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removed to establish the requisite injury.” Id. Without direct injury to the
class representative, the 5th Circuit reasoned “that the allegations are
insufficient to support the [constitutional] standing to assert this claim,”
which was distinct from and could not be conferred by statutory standing
alone. Id. at 547.
CONCLUSION: Imminent risk of default to an ERISA defined-benefit
plan, such that the participant’s benefits are adversely affected, is required
for the claimants to have constitutional standing when there is fiduciary
misconduct by an employer managing an ERISA defined-benefit plan. Id.
at 546.
United States v. Ayika, 837 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “Whether any part of the [money] remaining in [a bank]
account can be ‘traced,’ for the purposes of § 982(a)(7), [or alternatively,
§ 853(p),] to [defendant’s] crime of conviction.” Id. at 472.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that because “there were many
deposits and withdrawals of both legitimately and fraudulently obtained
funds over the life of the [bank] account . . . tracing the remaining funds
under § 982(a)(7) . . . would be virtually impossible.” Id. at 473. The
court further explained that since the Government provided evidence that
only “33.55% of the funds deposited into the [bank]
account . . . represented gross proceeds of the crime of conviction . . . the
Government . . . failed to prove that it is, more likely than not, that the
funds remaining in that account [were] traceable to [defendant’s] fraud[.]”
Id. at 474. The court then turned its attention to “another statutory
provision asserted in the pleadings and orders below[]: 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(p)” and clarified that “the Government cannot, consistent with the
statutes, treat § 982(a)(7) and § 853(p) as interchangeable.” Id. at 474–75.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “the funds deposited into the
[bank] account over the life of the account, those that remain, and the
assets purchased with funds therefrom, are not traceable to the crime of
conviction and are hence not forfeitable under § 982(a)(7).” Id. at 476.
The court further held that only “when the Government makes a showing
that the defendant commingled funds, both legal and fraudulent, which
cannot be divided without difficulty, and consequently rendered
forfeitable assets untraceable to the crime of conviction under § 982(a)(1),
[then] the Government may turn to § 853(p).” Id. at 476.
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SIXTH CIRCUIT
Berry v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 832 F.3d 627 (6th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether the U.S. Department of Energy’s decision not
to reopen a claim seeking compensation to a survivor of an employee
covered under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation
Program Act (EEOICPA) is subject to judicial review. Id. at 632.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the challenged action must be “made
reviewable by statute” or be a “final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in court.” Id. at 632. The court examined whether
the refusal to reopen constitutes a “final agency action” for judicial review.
Id. The court further noted that there is a distinction between requests to
reopen based on new evidence and those based on material error for
judicial review purposes. Id. at 636.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that the survivor’s request to
reopen his claim based on a “purported material error in the Department’s
original decision” was “‘committed to agency discretion’ and
unreviewable under the APA.” Id. at 639.
Brown v. Battle Creek Police Dep’t, 844 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “Whether the killing of a dog constitutes ‘seizure’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 566.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit explained that a “large number of this
Court’s sister circuits have already concluded that, ‘the use of deadly force
against a household pet is reasonable only if the pet poses an [imminent]
danger and the use of force is unavoidable.’” Id. (citations omitted)
(parenthetical in original). The 6th Circuit cites, with approval, precedent
from the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 10th, and D.C. Circuits, and adopts the same
position, that the killing of a companion animal qualifies as an
unconstitutional seizure. Id. The 6th Circuit identified that “every sister
circuit that had confronted the issue concluded that an individual has a
property right in their dog.” Id.
CONCLUSION: “[T]here is a constitutional right under the Fourth
Amendment to not have one’s dog unreasonably seized.” Id.
Cole v. City of Memphis, 839 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether ascertainability is a requirement for class
certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). Id. at
541.
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that the 1st, 3rd, and 10th
Circuits have held that ascertainability is inapplicable to Rule 23(b)(2). Id.
The court reasoned that (b)(2) class members are distinguishable from
(b)(3) class members who are entitled to notice and are able to opt-out of
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the class. Id. The court further noted that “the focus in a (b)(2) class is
more heavily placed on the nature of the remedy sought, and because a
remedy obtained by one member will naturally affect the others, the
identities of individual class members are less critical in a (b)(2) action
than in a (b)(3) action.” Id. at 542.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit agreed with the other circuit courts
and held that “ascertainability is not an additional requirement for
certification of a (b)(2) class seeking only injunctive and declaratory
relief.” Id.
Loffredo v. Daimler AG, 666 F. App’x 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “[W]hether [Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA)] preempts a state-law antidiscrimination claim that is
filed outside a corresponding federal law’s statute of limitations but within
the state law’s longer statute of limitations, despite both state and federal
law imposing liability for the same substantive conduct.” Id. at 377.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit first noted that ERISA’s savings clause
only saves state laws from preemption if their preemption would impair or
modify federal law. Id. at 378. The court held that the preemption of the
state law at issue here would not impair or modify its federal counterpart,
thus the state law was not saved from ERISA preemption. Id. Particularly,
“because the [federal law] would continue to ‘prohibit precisely the same
employment practices, and be enforced in precisely the same manner,’”
even if the state law claim was preempted, application of the ERISA
savings clause was not warranted. Id. As such, the state law claim was
preempted, and the only remaining federal claim therefore had to comply
with a federal statute of limitations, not the longer state law statute of
limitations. Id. Since the Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim was filed
outside of the federal statute of limitations, yet within the state law statute
of limitations, dismissal of the claim for untimely file was appropriate, the
state law statute of limitations having been preempted. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “ERISA preempts
Plaintiffs’ age-discrimination claim because it is untimely under the
ADEA and preemption of Michigan’s statute of limitations neither impairs
nor modifies federal law.” Id.
Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether the term “intercept” as used in the Federal Wire
Tap Act (“Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 2511, requires that an acquisition of an
electronic communication occur contemporaneously with the transmission
of that communication. Id. at 627.
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ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that although “[t]he Act does not
explicitly require that the acquisition of a communication occur
contemporaneously with the transmission of the communication,” the 3rd,
5th, 9th, and 11th Circuits have interpreted the Act’s language and “have
uniformly concluded that an intercept requires contemporaneity.” Id. The
court noted that the Act draws a distinction between “electronic
communications” and “electronic storage.” Id. The court also noted that
the Act defines the former as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or
in part by wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system,” while the latter is defined as “(A) any temporary, intermediate
storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission thereof . . . (B) any storage of such communication by an
electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of
such communication.” Id. The court further reasoned that the term
“intercept” only applies to “electronic communications,” but not to “the
acquisition of electronic signals that are no longer being transferred.” Id.
The court also reasoned that “[o]nce the transmission of the
communication has ended, the communication ceases to be a
communication at all” and “becomes part of ‘electronic storage,’ which a
person cannot ‘intercept.’” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit joined the 3rd, 5th, 9th, and 11th
Circuits and held that “in order for an ‘intercept’ to occur for purposes of
the Wiretap Act, the electronic communication at issue must be acquired
contemporaneously with the transmission of that communication [before
it becomes ‘electronic storage’].” Id. at 629.
Reyes v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether solicitation of prostitution is a crime of moral
turpitude. Id. at 559.
ANALYSIS: The court applied the “‘categorical framework’ to
determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude.” Id. Under this
framework, the court determined not “whether the actual conduct
constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, but whether the full range
of conduct encompassed by the statute constitutes a crime of moral
turpitude.” Id. The court relied upon a decision of the 9th Circuit, which
found that solicitation of prostitution was a crime of moral turpitude due
to several decisions of the Board of Immigration Affairs that had ruled as
such. Id. at 560. The court agreed with the 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits and
held that the Bureau of Immigration Affairs’ reasonable interpretation of
the Immigration and Nationality Act was entitled to Chevron deference.
Id.
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CONCLUSION: The court held that “[i]f the [Bureau of Immigration
Affairs] considers prostitution to be a [crime involving moral turpitude],
there is no reason to consider the solicitation of prostitution” not to be. Id.
United States v. Beckham, 838 F.3d 731 (6th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether Amendment 759 to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id.
at 735.
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by noting that every circuit
that had considered whether Amendment 759 to the U.S.S.G. violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause had rejected it. Id. at 735. The court noted that the
Ex Post Factor Clause “forbids a change in law that increases the
potential punishment for past conduct.” Id. In this case, the court
reasoned that Amendment 759 “simply restricts the district court’s
discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to a future Guidelines
amendment, which prisoners have no entitlement to.” Id. (emphasis in
original). As such, it did not present any Ex Post Facto Clause problems.
Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “a decision by the Sentencing
Commission to limit the class of defendants who may benefit from a future
amendment does not have any bearing on the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
United States v. Bonds, 839 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether United States Sentencing Guidelines
(U.S.S.G.) Amendment 742, which includes a provision that required a
two-point enhancement to a criminal defendant’s offense level, may be
applied in conjunction with U.S.S.G. Amendment 782, a retroactive
reduction to “the base offense levels for most drug-trafficking crimes,” for
purposes of reducing a term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). Id. at 528.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the policy statement in U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10 instructs a court to amend a defendant’s guideline range, and
therefore reduce a term of imprisonment, “if the applicable guideline range
has subsequently been lowered by one of the amendments named in
subsection (d).” Id. at 529. The court noted that Amendment 782 was
listed in subsection (d), but Amendment 742 was “notably absent.” Id.
The court reasoned that this was a “clear and unambiguous” direction that
only the amendments listed in subsection (d) could be applied when
reducing a defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Id.
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CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that the retroactive “Amendment
782 does not permit district courts to apply other non-retroactive
amendments” to reduce a guidelines range. Id. at 528–29.
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Central States v. American International Group, Inc., 840 F.3d 448 (7th
Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether a coordination of benefits disputes seeks
appropriate equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Id. at 449.
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by noting that the 8th, 2nd,
3rd, 5th, 6th, and 8th Circuits have already addressed this issue and all
have held that the relief sought is legal, not equitable. Id. at 452. These
Circuits based their reasoning of a series of Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the phrase “appropriate equitable relief.” Id. The Court, in
those opinions, explained that whether a remedy is available “depends on
(1) the basis for the plaintiff’s claim and (2) the nature of the underlying
remedies sought.” Id. at 453 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Both must be equitable for a claim to proceed. Id. Importantly, the
Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he remedy is properly regarded as
equitable only if the plaintiff seeks the return of specifically identified
funds that remain in the defendant’s possession or . . . traceable items that
the defendant purchased with the funds.” Id. (internal quotations and
citations omitted). The court noted that the trustee’s request for
declaratory relief “requests money damages, the epitome of legal relief,”
and as such his suit cannot proceed. Id. at 454.
CONCLUSION: The court joined the other circuits in holding that “the
trustee’s suit against the insurers to recoup amounts it paid for the
beneficiaries’ medical care seeks legal relief, not equitable relief, and as
such is not authorized,” by ERISA. Id. at 455.
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Belmont, 831 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether the meaning of “engage in the business of”
within 18 U.S.C. § 842(a)(1) (“the explosives statute”) requires a
profit/livelihood motive, or if it merely requires a showing that one is
actively buying, selling, and procuring explosives in commerce. Id. at
1100–1102.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the explosive statute makes it
unlawful to “engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or
dealing in explosive materials without a license issued under this chapter.”
Id. at 1100 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 842(a)(1)) (internal quotation marks

2017]

First Impressions

263

omitted). The court then considered Congress’s interpretation of “engage
in the business of” under the Gun Control Act—which required a showing
of profit or livelihood motive—but dismissed this interpretation as it was
enacted to protect gun owning citizens’ Second Amendment rights. Id. at
1101. Next, the court considered the 10th Circuit’s interpretation of
“engage in the business of” under the explosive statute, which only
requires a showing that one is actively involved in buying or selling
explosives in commerce. Id. The court noted that “the explosives statue
defined ‘manufacture’ as ‘any person engaged in the business of
manufacturing explosive materials for purposes of sale or distribution or
for his own use.’” Id. at 1102 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 841(h)).
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that the explosive statute does
not require a showing of profit or livelihood motive to show that one has
engaged in business of manufacturing explosives. Id. at 1102.
NINTH CIRCUIT
Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, 832 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir.
2016)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a federally recognized Indian tribe waives
its sovereign immunity from suit by exercising its right to remove to
federal court a case filed against it in state court [while promptly asserting
its immunity defense].” Id. at 1014.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[t]he doctrine of . . . sovereign
immunity derives from the status of Indian tribes as ‘separate sovereigns
preexisting the Constitution’” and the courts employ a “strong
presumption against [its] waiver.” Id. at 1016. The court noted that a tribe
“may lose its immunity from suit” through a congressional or personal
waiver. Id. The court further reasoned that “a waiver of [tribal] sovereign
immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed’” and
that expression must “manifest the tribe’s intent to surrender immunity in
‘clear’ and unmistakable terms.” Id. The court also noted that “[b]y filing
a lawsuit, a tribe may . . . ’ consent to the court’s jurisdiction to determine
the claims brought’ and thereby agree to be bound by the court decision
on those claims. Id. at 1017. The court reasoned, however, that “[b]y
consenting to the court’s jurisdiction to determine its own claims . . . a
tribe does not automatically waive its immunity as to claims that could be
asserted against it, even as to ‘related matters . . . aris[ing] from the same
set of underlying facts.’” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that, “an Indian tribe’s removal
of a case from state to federal court does not, in and of itself, effect a
waiver of its tribal immunity.” Id. at 1023–24.
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Daniels v. MSPB, 832 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether the Merit System Protection Board (“Board”)
had jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s appeal alleging that he properly
made a non-frivolous disclosure that was protected under the
Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). Id. at 1054.
ANALYSIS: The WPA was amended in 2012, allowing United States
Court of Appeals to review Board decisions pertaining to individual right
of action appeals. Id. An aggrieved employee may seek recourse from the
Board by filing an individual right of action (“IRA”). Id. at 1051. For the
Board to have jurisdiction over such an appeal “the appellant . . . [must]
make ‘non-frivolous allegations’ that (1) he engaged in whistleblowing
activity by making a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8) . . . .” Id. The court noted that “Congress explicitly stated
that it only intended to protect disclosures of certain types of wrongdoing,”
in passing the WPA. Id. at 1055. As such, the court did “not undermine
congressional intent . . . [or] improperly limit the definition of ‘disclosure’
by concluding that an erroneous agency ruling or adjudication is not a
violation of law for purposes of the WPA.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “[a]n agency ruling or
adjudication, even if erroneous, is not the type of ‘wrongdoing’
contemplated by the WPA.” Id. at 1055–56.
Helping Hand Tools v. United States EPA, 836 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether the “[Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
is] required to consider solar power and a greater natural gas mix as clean
fuel control technologies in [best available control technology (BACT)]
analysis.” Id. at 1005.
ANALYSIS: The court took into consideration the availability of
control alternatives in a BACT analysis, but hesitated to require the
consideration of control alternatives that would redefine the source—
alternatives that would require a complete redesign of the facility. Id. at
1006. The court explained that the Defendant properly defined the project
and rejected control technologies that redefined the project with thoughtful
and rational explanations and was consistent with the EPA’s prior
guidance. Id. at 1012–13. Furthermore, because of the complicity
surrounding the analysis of the environmental effect of different biomass
fuels in the ever-developing field of climate-change science, the court
deferred to Defendant’s expertise when the record showed that its
endeavors were reasonable. Id. at 1013.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the EPA is not required to
consider solar power and a greater natural gas mix. Id. at 1005.
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Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the U.S. Constitution allows law
enforcement officers to restrain a female inmate while she is pregnant, in
labor, or during postpartum recovery.” Id. at 1243.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that this constitutional question
stems from the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 1249. The court stated that, under the Eighth
Amendment, “a plaintiff must show that the defendant: (1) exposed her to
a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) was deliberately indifferent to
her constitutional rights.” Id. The court stated that “[w]ithout more than
a broad assertion about the penological interest in restraining all inmates—
even one who is in labor—a reasonable jury could find that” policies
authorizing the restraint of pregnant inmates could lead “to a substantial
and unjustified risk of harm.” Id. at 1255–56. The court further stated
that, “a jury could find [law enforcement officers] were deliberately
indifferent to any risk created by the restraints used on [a pregnant female
inmate].” Id. at 1257.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that whether such action is
constitutionally permissible “depends on factual disputes a properly
instructed jury must resolve.” Id. at 1243.
Move, Inc. v. Citigroup Global Mkts., 840 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether equitable tolling applies to the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA). Id. at 1156.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the case law from other circuits is
conflicting and most circuits have declined to rule on whether equitable
tolling applies to the FAA. Id. The court reasoned that the text, structure
and purpose of the FAA are consistent with equitable tolling. Id. at 1157.
The court considered whether a limitations period is set forth in “unusually
emphatic form,” is “unusually generous,” or uses “highly detailed” and
“technical” language, and whether the statute “reiterated the limitations
period several times in several different ways,” to determine whether
Congress intended equitable tolling to apply. Id. The court reasoned that
the structure and purpose of the FAA is not incompatible with equitable
tolling. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the FAA is subject to
equitable tolling. Id. at 1156.
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Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “Whether an ineligible alien who fraudulently enters the
[Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”)] is bound by the VWP’s limitations,
including its waiver of any challenge to deportation other than asylum.”
Id. at 1080.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the 2nd, 7th, and 8th Circuits
have held that “the VWP limitations apply to those admitted under the
program without being eligible.” Id. The 9th Circuit explained that other
circuits relied on a regulation issued by the Attorney General pursuant to
the statute enacting the VWP to fill a gap regarding fraudulent entrants.
Id. The court noted that this regulation contained a rule that “those who
‘present[] fraudulent or counterfeit travel documents’ will be removed
‘without referral of the alien to an immigration judge,’ unless the alien
‘applies for asylum.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). The court then
explained that, after applying a level of deference appropriate under
Chevron, there was “no real issue concerning the validity of the regulation
interpreting the statute.” Id. at 1080.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that an “alien signing the VWP
forms gives up any right to challenge removal, except on asylum grounds,
if [the alien] overstays the grant of time permitted by the VWP.” Id.
Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “Whether California’s 10-day wait to take possession of
a firearm violates Second Amendment rights when applied to subsequent
purchasers who pass the background check in less than ten days.” Id. at
827.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[t]he waiting period does not
prevent any individuals from owning a firearm,” nor does the regulation
“prevent, restrict or place any conditions on how guns are stored or used
after a purchaser takes possession.” Id. The court noted that intermediate
scrutiny was appropriate and proceeded to apply the two-step analysis. Id.
The 9th Circuit stated that the first step was satisfied because the parties
agreed that safety and minimizing gun violence are important objectives.
Id. The court reasoned that the regulation reasonably achieved the
government’s objectives because a “cooling-off period would serve to
discourage . . . conduct and would impose no serious burden on the core
Second Amendment right of defense of the home . . . .” Id. at 828. The
9th Circuit further reasoned that the purpose of the regulation is public
safety and “[t]he waiting period provides time not only for background
checks, but for the purchaser to reflect on what he or she is doing, and,
perhaps, for second thoughts that might prevent gun violence.” Id. at 829.
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that ‘[t]he State has established
that there is a reasonable fit between important safety objectives and the
application of the WPLs,” and, as such, the 10-day wait does not violate
the Second Amendment. Id.
Tellez v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether “[a]n alien [has] ‘reentered’ the United States
for purposes of reinstating a removal order, . . . when she was previously
removed at a border crossing checkpoint.” Id. at 1177.
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by noting that the relevant
statute states that “[i]f the Attorney General finds that an alien has
reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having
departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal
is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or
reviewed . . . and the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any
time after the reentry.” Id. The court reasoned that even if the alien was
promptly removed at her first entry attempt into the United States, that the
alien’s second attempt to enter the United States qualifies as “reentry.” Id.
at 1178. The court acknowledged that historically, the definition of
“entry” under 9th Circuit precedent was narrower, having “not been
accomplished until physical presence is accompanied by freedom from
official restraint.” Id. The court distinguished this precedent by limiting
the definition of “reentry” only “to the reinstatement provision’s definition
of ‘reentry.’” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that when “an alien is issued an
expedited removal order at a U.S. border-crossing checkpoint, that alien
has entered the United States for the purpose of the reinstatement
provision’s ‘reentry’ requirement.” Id. at 1177.
United States v. Kaplan, 836 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether the reuse of single-use plastic needle guides
during prostate biopsy exams can be criminally prosecuted under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 331(k). Id.
at 1208.
ANALYSIS: The court first stated that the case turned “on the
interpretation of ‘held for sale’” under [the statute], and, specifically,
whether a doctor’s use of a device in the course of treating a patient be
considered a ‘sale’ under the statute[.]” Id. The court then noted that
Congress intended to “protect consumers from dangerous products” until
the products reach the “ultimate consumer,” patients. Id. (internal citations
omitted). The 9th Circuit further rejected the argument that a single-use
device cannot be “held for sale” because it is more appropriately
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interpreted as being “held for use.” Id. at 1209. The court reasoned that
“[a] single-use device is meant to be ‘consumed’ in the course of treating
a patient—just like a drug.” Id. at 1210. The court then considered the
commercial nature of a physician’s business, stating that “when a
physician uses a disposable device on a patient, the device is ‘held for sale’
within the meaning of the FDCA, provided that there is a commercial
relationship between the doctor and the patient and that the device is one
that is meant to be ‘consumed’ in the process.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a “physician’s use of a
consumable, single-use device on a paying patient satisfies the ‘held for
sale’ element under 21 U.S.C. § 331(k),” and thus can be criminally
prosecuted under the FDCA. Id. at 1211.
United States v. Kaplan, 839 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether to use fair market value or replacement value
of destroyed property when calculating a restitution award. Id. at 800.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the purpose of the Mandatory
Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is to fully compensate victims for their
losses, and to restore victims to their original state prior to the criminal act.
Id. The court further noted that the Supreme Court has held “that the
ordinary meaning of ‘restitution’ is restoring someone to a position he
occupied before a particular event.” Id. at 801.
CONCLUSION: While fair market value generally provides the best
measure to ensure that restitution is the full amount, replacement value is
an appropriate measure of destroyed property under the MVRA when the
fair market value is either difficult to determine or would be an inadequate
measure of the value necessary to make the victim whole. Id. at 802.
United States SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION ONE: Whether Rule 13a-14 of the Securities Exchange
Act “includes an implicit truthfulness requirement.” Id. at 1112.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that Rule 13a-14 was enacted under the
authority of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, which includes
provisions that require companies to make filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) that are not misleading. Id. at 1113. The
court further noted that it has previously held other similarly drafted
provisions in the Securities Exchange Act to include an implicit
truthfulness requirement. Id. Additionally, the 9th Circuit noted that other
circuit courts “have also read rules promulgated under § 13 to create
liability for false statements even when the rules did not explicitly require
truthfulness.” Id.
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CONCLUSION: Rule 13a-14 of the Exchange Act carries an implicit
truthfulness requirement. Id.
QUESTION TWO: Whether under Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 304
(“SOX 304”), CEOs or CFOs are required “to have personally engaged in
misconduct before they are required to disgorge profits.” Id. at 1114.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that, while no circuit court had
addressed the issue, “most district courts to have examined it have
concluded that SOX 304 does not require CEOs or CFOs to have
personally engaged in misconduct before they are required to disgorge
profits under that statute.” Id. at 1115. The court noted that this finding
is consistent with the plain language of the statute and its legislative
history. Id. at 1114–15. The court further reasoned that the language of
the statute suggested, “that it is the issuer’s misconduct that matters, and
not the personal misconduct of the CEO or CFO.” Id. at 1114.
CONCLUSION: SOX 304 does not require CEOs or CFOs to have
engaged in personal misconduct to entitle the SEC to seek disgorgement.
Id. at 1116.
TENTH CIRCUIT
General Steel Domestic Sales, L.L.C. v. Chumley, 840 F.3d 1178 (10th
Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether the immunity provision of 47 U.S.C. § 230
“provides immunity from suit . . . such that a denial would permit an
interlocutory appeal”. Id. at 1181.
ANALYSIS: The court began by explaining that the Communication
Decency Act (CDA) was enacted to shield children from Internet content
that is sexually explicit. Id. Section 230, however, was enacted because
of a recognition that tort-based lawsuits pose a threat to freedom of speech
on the Internet. Id. Defendants asserted that the statutory language of
§ 230 should be read to imply that CDA immunity bars suit as well as
liability under that statute. Id. The court noted, however, that “reading
the text in its entirety reveals that [§ 230] is merely a preemption
provision . . . [and] does not contain an explicit bar to suit.” Id. at 1182.
The court reasoned that despite the Defendants’ arguments, the statutory
language must contain an explicit guarantee of immunity and, without one,
no such finding of immunity from suit can be found. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that because § 230 of the CDA
does not contain an explicit grant of immunity from suit, no such finding
of immunity could be implied from the statutory language. Id.
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George v. Urban Settlement Servs., 833 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether a plausible promissory estoppel claim arises
when a party demonstrates a defendant’s “unambiguous promises to
provide permanent [Home affordable Modification Program (HAMP)]
loan modifications for eligible borrowers.” Id. at 1257.
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit addressed the lower court’s suggestion
of “the existence of a circuit split on this issue.” Id. at 1259. The 10th
Circuit noted that “our examination of the cases the district court relied on
reveals that other circuits have declined to find clear and unambiguous
promises when considering documents or circumstances that differ
significantly from those [in the other circuits].” Id. The 10th Circuit
joined the 1st, 7th, and 9th Circuits in finding the first element of a
plausible promissory estoppel claim. Id. at 1260.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit ultimately rejected the district
court’s acknowledgment of a circuit split, and joined all other courts that
have addressed this issue in concluding that a “document [which] clearly
and unambiguously promises to provide permanent HAMP loan
modifications to borrowers” is sufficient to allege a promise for a
promissory estoppel claim. Id. at 1260.
Kingsbury v. Westlake Mgmt. Co., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23416 (10th
Cir. December 30, 2016)
QUESTION ONE: Which limitations period the Oklahoma courts
would apply to an action to satisfy a judgment against one of the partners
in a partnership for the partnership’s liability. Id. at *6.
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by noting that the complaint
contains “no allegations of individual wrongdoing, nor does the complaint
identify the individual conduct of either [partner] as a basis for personal
liability.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Rather, the
complaint “merely [sought] to impose liability on [the partners] for
partnership debt by operation of Oklahoma statute.” Id. (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
CONCLUSION: “The Oklahoma courts would apply the five-year
statute of limitations governing a suit for debt.” Id.
QUESTION TWO: When the Oklahoma courts would deem that
limitations period to have commenced. Id. at *6.
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by stating that “the
Oklahoma statutes make clear that a “judgment against a partnership is not
by itself a judgment against a partner.” Id. As such, a creditor’s rights
against a partner do not arise when a partnership incurs an obligation. Id.
at *7.
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CONCLUSION: Oklahoma courts would “define accrual as occurring
when those rights arise.” Id.
QUESTION THREE: Whether Oklahoma partnership law compels a
contrary conclusion. Id. at *6.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that Oklahoma law “affords wouldbe plaintiffs the option of suing in the same action or in separate actions,”
and, as such, “suggests the Legislature considers the collection action to
be separate from the underlying litigation.” Id. at *7. Further, the court
noted that Oklahoma law “merely mandates that before the creditor
attempts to satisfy an obligation of the partnership against the assets of the
partners, he must first obtain a judgment against the partnership based on
the same claim, and unsuccessfully attempt to satisfy that judgment against
partnership assets.” Id. at *9. As such, the statute by its plain language
“does not dictate that the action against the partners be for the exact same
claim; all that is required is that it be based on the same claim.” Id.
CONCLUSION: Oklahoma partnership law did not prevent the second
action because the decedent’s son obtained, in the negligence action, the
requisite judgment based on the same claim. Id. at *8 (internal quotations
omitted and emphasis in original).
United States v. Miller, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22433 (10th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “[W]hether to resolve on the merits a § 2255 motion
that hinges on an issue that will be resolved in the near future by the
Supreme Court, but in all likelihood not soon enough to benefit the
defendant seeking relief.” Id. at *7–8.
ANALYSIS: Defendant argued that he was entitled to a significantly
lower sentence because his initial sentence was based on the application
of a rule that was rendered invalid by a subsequent Supreme Court
decision. Id. at *2. The district court elected a stay order until another
relevant case was decided. Id. at *3. Defendant argued that the stay order,
in effect, operated as a final dismissal of his claim. Id. at *3–4. The court
reasoned that “staying resolution of his motion until the Supreme Court
resolves [the issue] will irreparably damage Miller by resulting in his
unnecessary confinement.” Id. at *7. As such, the court reasoned that a
stay amounted to an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court.
Id. Even though the Supreme Court would likely resolve the issue in the
near future, the court noted that it was not likely to happen “soon enough
to benefit the defendant seeking relief.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court found that defendant’s right to issuance of
the writ was clear and indisputable because, without it, he would
effectively be denied his right to timely resolution of his § 2255 motion.
Id. at *8.
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United States v. Supreme Court, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18543 (10th
Cir. Oct. 13, 2016)
QUESTION: Whether New Mexico’s Rule 16-308(E) provisions may
survive a preemption challenge considering the federal grand jury law. Id.
at 923.
ANALYSIS: New Mexico’s Rule 16-308(E) “prohibits a prosecutor
from subpoenaing a lawyer to present evidence about a past or present
client in a grand-jury or other criminal proceeding unless such evidence is
‘essential’ and ‘there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the
information.” Id. at 893. The court reasoned the “Anglo-American legal
tradition and the Constitution itself” carve out a unique position for the
federal grand jury system. Id. at 923. The court noted the Framers
designed such a system to ensure a neutral process to ascertain truth and
justice, apart from the three branches of government. Id. The court
further reasoned that any such conflict with the federal law “would impede
the grand jury’s broad investigative mandate—which the Framers
specifically envisioned in enacting the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.” Id. at 928.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held “Rule 16-308(E)’s challenged
provisions are conflict-preempted in the grand-jury setting because the
essentiality and no-other-feasible-alternative requirements pose an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of the federal legal regime governing grand-jury practice.” Id.
at 923 (internal quotation marks omitted).
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Alberts v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 834 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether a seaman’s work in international waters on a
cruise
ship
that
travels
to
foreign
ports
constitutes
“performance . . . abroad” under the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. § 202.
Id. at 1203.
ANALYSIS: Section 202 of the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards only allows for
arbitration agreements between United States citizens when the
contractual relationship between the parties envisages performance
abroad. Id. at 1203. The crux of the dispute was the determination of what
was the proper definition of the term “envisages performance . . . aboard.”
Id. at 1204. Plaintiff argued “abroad” means “in one or more foreign
states,” while Defendant argued that abroad means “anywhere outside a
country.” Id. The court found flaws in both party’s definitions. Id. at
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1205. Ultimately, the court ruled that because Plaintiff worked on a cruise
ship that traveled in international waters to foreign ports, his contract
“envisaged performance abroad,” thus the arbitration clause was found to
be enforceable under the Convention. Id. at 1204.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “performance abroad”
includes a seaman’s work traveling to or from a foreign country. Id. at
1204.
Gelin v. United States, AG, 837 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: “Whether ‘abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult’
is a crime involving moral turpitude.” Id. at 1243.
ANALYSIS: In addressing whether a crime involves moral turpitude,
the 11th Circuit first determined whether a categorical approach or
modified categorical approach is appropriate. Id. at 1241. The categorical
approach “consider[s] only the fact of conviction and the statutory
definition of the offense, rather than the specific facts underlying the
defendant’s case.” Id. The 11th Circuit further reasoned that “a person
who knowingly or willfully abuses an elderly person or disabled adult
without causing great bodily harm” constitutes a crime involving moral
turpitude. Id. at 1242. The 11th Circuit stated that this act “qualifies as a
[crime involving moral turpitude] because of (1) the culpable state of mind
required by the statute, and (2) the particularly vulnerable nature of the
victims.” Id. at 1243.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “a conviction for abuse of
an elderly person or disabled adult . . . is categorically a crime involving
moral turpitude.” Id. at 1247–48.
United States v. Phillips, 834 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2016)
QUESTION: Whether “the police [can] arrest someone based solely
on a civil writ of bodily attachment for unpaid child support[.]” Id. at
1178.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “a court will issue a writ of bodily
attachment for unpaid child support if it determines, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that a person is liable for civil contempt.” Id. at 1180–81.
The court explained that the Fourth Amendment requires only probable
cause in order to issue a warrant for a civil or criminal offense and that
writs of bodily attachment are, therefore, subject to a higher standard for
issuance. Id. at 1181. The court further reasoned that writs for bodily
attachment are warrants in the historical sense in that they require a
person’s arrest and production before the court. Id. The court finally noted
the close analogy between writs for bodily attachment and bench
warrants—which are also based on civil offenses—and noted that bench
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warrants have long been held to satisfy the Fourth Amendment by the
courts. Id. at 1182.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that a “writ of bodily
attachment for unpaid child support is a warrant for Fourth Amendment
purposes.” Id.

